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SUMMARY 
Referring, as a general background, to the long waves theory, the paper 
shows that Western economies now seem to be in the recovery phase of the 
long stagnation which started in 1974 and that, probably, a new long wave will 
begin in this decade. 
The main factor justifying this hypothesis is the technological revolution 
in computer and  information technologies  initiated in the Seventies,  which 
reproduces the long waves mechanism. 
Two other elements corroborate the above assessment on the long term 
prospects : 
i)  the  recovery  in  profitability  at  the  beginning  of the  eighties,  an 
evolution that usually characterizes the recovery phase of the long stagnation; 
ii)  the unusual length of the prosperity phase of the business cycle in the 
eighties.  Of  course, this aspect plays a subsidiary role with respect to the two 
others  mentioned  above.  However,  taken  in  conjunction  with  them,  it 
reinforces the opinion that underlying recent favourable performances, there 
is a change in the long term trend. -1-
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1982 the business cycle in the Community has been expansionary. 
From  1974 to  1982,  the  EUR-12  GDP and  industrial  production average 
growth rate at constant prices was 1. 9% and 0. 8% per year, while from 1982 
to 1990 the growth of GDP and of industrial production was 2.7% per year. 
Similarly, gross investment, which declined at the average rate of 0.2% per 
year from  1974 to  1982,  increased by 4.0%  per year from  1982 to 1990. 
Recent years have also contributed to a slight reduction in the unemployment 
rate (9% in 1989 as against 10-11 % in the second half of the Eighties) and to 
a small increase in employment (1.4% per year from 1986 to 1989). 
The question thus raises whether this expansion is purely short term or 
whether it is the second phase of  the long term stagnation (the recovery) which 
started in 1974.  Were the answer positive, a new long term expansion could 
start in the present decade.  The diagnosis of how the present situation will 
evolve has profound implications for economic policy.  If  the present recovery 
is not just a short term phenomenon, the conventional approach of  demand and 
supply management is no longer relevant, and the main focus of Community 
and national actions will instead be on technological change, industrial policy 
and the institutional and social changes required to implement the new regime 
of accumulation. 
The analysis will be conducted within the theoretical framework of  long 
waves (Van Duijn 1983).  Although still controversial, the recent empirical 
work on the existence of  long waves in production and innovations have made 
this  approach  sound  enough  to be taken  as  a  background  for the present 
investigation. 
In part I of this paper I shall present a brief summary of the long wave 
theory, focussing on the effects of technological change. Part II will present 
the factors justifying the argument that a new long wave will probably begin -2-
in  the  nineties.  They  are:  the  technological  revolution  in  computer  and 
information  technology,  the  recovery  in  profitability  and  the  different 
behaviour of the business cycle. -3-
PART I 
THE LESSONS FROM THE PAST : 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND THEORIES 
The  results  of  researches  on  long  waves  in  output<l)  can  be 
summarized as follows : 
a)  the long term evolution of the industrialized capitalist economies has 
followed a quasi-cyclical pattern (wave) of 50-60 years; 
b)  one of the fundamental causes of the long upswing is a "technological 
revolution", which presents these characteristics: 
- radical innovations do not appear at random but show a precise time 
pattern, correlated with the economic long waves; 
- innovations cluster; 
- the  radical  innovations  which  materialize  first  are  process  and 
product innovations  in existing  industries;  they  are followed  by 
product innovations giving rise to entirely new industries; 
c)  to be successful, technological revolutions require profound institutional 
changes; 
d)  the rate of profit plays an important role in the long wave mechanism; 
e)  the business cycle behaves differently according to  the phases of the 
long wave. 
I.  The long waves : a real phenomenon ? 
1. The statistical data of developed countries show a quite regular recurrence 
of 25-30 year periods of sustained growth followed by periods of stagnation 
of the same duration.  Since the industrial revolution, these fluctuations have 
produced four long wages (table 1) (see Van Duijn, 1983 : 143 and 155; 1984. 
This author takes into account the results of other scholars). -4-
Each long wave develops in four phases: 
prosperity, in which growth is high; 
recession, in which growth decelerates; 
depression, in which growth is near zero or even negative; 
recovery, in which the growth rate is modest. 
According  to  Van  Duijn  (1983),  prosperity  and  recession  form  the  long 
expansion while depression and recovery belong to the long stagnation. 
2.  However,  the  existence of long  waves  in  "real"  variables  is  contested, 
particularly for the first long wave<2). For instance,  taking data for the UK, 
France,  Germany and  the U.S.A., Solomou  (1987)  and  Van Ewijk (1982) 
reject the hypothesis of a 50 year cycle in GOP or industrial production<3>. 
Note that empirical testing of long waves  is  a tricky question.  Quite 
often,  scholars  use  spectral  analysis  (e.g.  Van  Ewijk,  1982),  a  method 
specially devised  to  study cyclical movements.  However,  when applied to 
long waves, this method presents serious drawbacks because: a) the statistical 
series are not sufficiently long, since they cover a maximum of four waves; 
b) they do not meet the demands of a stationary series and the elimination of 
the  trend can affect the identification of peaks<4>;  c)  this  method  implies a 
regularity of cycles that does not actually happen and that,  moreover, is not 
indispensable in order to confirm the occurrence of long waves.  For these 
reasons, Van Duijn concludes that "spectral analysis cannot prove or disprove 
the existence of long waves". (Van Duijn 1983  : 172). -5-
TABLE 1  : The long wave chronology (1) 
I. 1782-1845 
A) expansion 
B) stagnation 
II. 1845-1892 
A) expansion 
B)  stagnation 
m. 1892-1948 
A) expansion 
B)  stagnation 
IV. 1948-(1995 ?) 
A) expansion 
B)  stagnation 
(war 
(war 
(war 
1782-1802 
1802-1815) 
1815-1825 
1825-1836 
1836-1845 
1845-1866 
1866-1872 
1872-1883 
1883-1892 
1892-1913 
1914-1918) 
1920-1929 
1929-1937 
1939-1945) 
1937-1948 
1948-1966 
1966-1973 
1973-1982 
1982-0 0  0  (1995?) 
- prosperity 
-recession 
- depression 
-recovery 
- prosperity . 
-recession 
- depression 
-recovery 
- prosperity 
-recession 
- depression 
-recovery 
- prosperity 
-recession 
- depression 
-recovery 
(1)  This periodization is taken from Van Duijn (1983  : 143 and 155). 
According to Van Duijn (1984),  the depression phase of the fourth 
long wave ended in 1982. 
This is just an example of the more general problem that the statistical 
method  adopted is  not  neutral with  respect to  the results  we obtain.  I am 
referring here to the "Slutsky effect" (Slutsky 1937) and to the "perspectivistic -6-
distortion"  (Reijnders  1990).  As  Slutsky  demonstrated,  the  smoothing 
procedure can,  in fact,  generate cycles  of different  length  which  are  not 
embedded in the original series.  The "perspectivistic distortion" depends on 
the time span of  the statistical investigation (the "window"):  a large "window" 
will emphasize the long cycles while a narrow "window" does the opposite. 
This is illustrated in figure  1.  Starting from a strictly periodic time series 
(with a period of  2-n-),  a linear trend is fitted in order to derive the cycle.  It 
appears that the apparent duration of this cycle is dependent on the length of 
the interval (the "window") and of its location relative to the series.  Thus, 
with a  "window" having a length of 21t we obtain the cycle of the left  -hand 
side of  fig. 1; with a shorter "window", in which the length concides with one 
of the points of inflection of the original data, the resulting cycle is depicted 
in the right  -hand side of figure 1. 
FIGURE 1:  mustration of perspectivistic distortion 
(Reijnders 1990, p. 137) 
4.---..----------,--------.,------, 
J. 
2. 
-I.  - n/2..  0  n/2  1t  Jn/"2 
Time 
Wave 
Trend  I 
Tr~nd:! 
2r.: 
Rc,iduall ----
Rc~iduai 2 ----(3) 
-7-
However, W. Stier has recently proposed a new filtering technique that 
should avoid these two ambushes and,  as  we  will  now  see,  this allows  for 
more positive results on the existence of long waves. 
3.  Using a new methodology,  Bieshaar and Kleinknecht (1984), Gerster 
(1988), Metz (1992) and Thompson (1990) provided evidence in favour of the 
long waves hypothesis.  Using a technique similar to the "spline" regression 
(cf.  Poirier 1976), Bieshaar and Kleinknecht studied  11  series of GDP and 
industrial production in seven core countries as well as for the world aggregate 
to  establish  whether they  follow  the  periodization  of table  1 above.  The 
results confirm the existence of long waves after 1890, except for the UK. 
Metz and  Gerster made further methodological progress by adopting 
Stier's filtering technique to detrend data.  Metz (1992) took the same series 
as  Bieshaar and  Kleinknecht,  but he  substituted the  data for the two  world 
wars  (considered  as  a  statistical  disturbance)  by  linear  interpolation.  He 
obtained clear and conclusive evidence not only for the existence of the third 
and fourth long waves, but also for the first and the second.  However, the 
first two long waves seem to have a different periodization than that shown in 
table 1: the first wave ends in 1820 (instead of 1845) and the second in 1885 
(a date near to 1892, as  reported in table 1), with a peak in  1860. 
Investigating a larger sample (130 price and  production series for  16 
countries), Gerster reached results that are similar to those of Metz.  However, 
unlike  this  author,  in  the  majority  of cases  Gerster found  cycles of 30-40 
years, shorter than long waves.  According to Metz, these discrepancies are 
explained bu the different treatment of world wars (Gerster does not eliminate 
these disturbing influences) and different definitions of possible cyclicity. 
The idea behind the evidence provided by Thompson (1990) is that long 
waves materialize first in a small number of leading sectors (those created by 
the technological revolution;  see paragraph 2 below),  in a leading economy 
(UK until 1890 and USA from 1890 to present).  Aggregating data on physical -8-
production of ten leading sectors from 1760 to 1985, Thompson compares the 
long  waves  of  the  leading  sectors  growth  rates  to  the  conventional 
Schumpeterian periodisation  (as  revised  by  Kuznets  and  Van  Duijn).  He 
obtains  two  main  results.  First of all,  there  is  a  good  match  between the 
Schumpeterian long waves and the waves of the leading sectors in the leading 
economies  (Thompson  1990  :  222).  Second,  there  is  also  close 
correspondence between the long wave in British-American leading sectors 
production and British-American industrial production (id. : 223).  This bears 
out the  assumption that leading  sectors  are one  of the principal engines of 
economic growth. 
Even if the final word has not yet been pronounced, it is reasonable to 
conclude that "today more skepticism is  needed to disbelieve in long waves 
than faith to believe in them"  (Screpanti 1984 : 519). 
ll. Explanation in terms of technological revolutions 
1.  The  Schumpeterian  explanation  of  long  waves  as  a  result  of  a 
technological revolution seems the most interesting (Schumpeter 1977). This 
theory has recently been taken up by a number of scholars (Mensch 1979, Van 
Duijn 1983, Kleinknecht 1987, Freeman and the SPRU group, Mandel1980, 
who  incorporates it into a broader synthesis)  and  has  also found  empirical 
support. 
Economic history shows,  in fact,  that each long  wave is rooted in a 
radical breakthrough in technology which has pervasive effects throughout the 
economy.  The  new  "technological  paradigm"(S)  resulting  from  this 
technological  revolution  makes  all  existing  plant  and  equipment  obsolete, 
requiring  massive  investment  to  replace  them.  This  initial  impetus  to 
economic activity and its multiplier effect provide the basis for the upswing in 
output. 
The first long wave was induced by early mechanization (the industrial -9-
revolution); the second one by steam power and the railway; the third long 
wave resulted from electrical and heavy engineering and the fourth from the 
Fordist mass production.  It will be seen later that the fifth long wave will 
probably result from computer and information technologies. 
2.  The technological revolution presents the following characteristics<6>: 
a)  it brings with it many clusters of radical and incremental innovations in 
related fields<7>.  This bunch of innovations- which directly or indirectly are 
generated  by the  first  technological  revolution  and  help  to  implement it -
further sustain economic activity by the investment it requires; 
b)  it relies on the availability of a particular input (or set of inputs) which 
is the key factor of the new technological paradigm.  It is supplied at low and 
falling relative cost in almost unlimited quantities over long periods and has 
a potential for use in many products and processes throughout the economic 
system.  These particular inputs were, respectively: cotton and pig iron in the 
first long wave; coal and transport in the second; steel in the third and oil in 
the fourth. 
There  is  no  unanimity  among  scholars  on  the  way  in  which  the 
technological revolution imposes itself.  For some (Van Duijn, Kleinknecht, 
Mandel) it is through discontinuous waves of innovation; for Freeman (1982) 
the new technological paradigm emerges gradually within the old, showing its 
decisive advantages during the stagnation phase of the previous long wave. 
3.  Van Duijn (1983) shows that, during the depression phase of the long 
wave, the major innovations tend to appear in the existing industries and they 
concern the process as well as the product. During the recovery, the number 
of major process innovations in existing industries falls  radically, while the 
flow of  product innovations continues.  However, the dominant feature of this 
phase  is  the  appearance  of radical  product  innovations  which  create  new 
industries.  The  propensity  to  innovate  therefore  seems  to  change  in -10-
accordance with the schema of Table 2. 
TABLE 2  : The propensity to innovate during the phases of the long wave 
(Van Duijn 1983 : 137) 
Type of  Stagnation  Expansion 
innovation  Depression  Recovery  Prosperity  Recession 
Product innovation  *  ****  **  * 
(new industries) 
Product innovation  ***  ***  *  * 
(existing industries) 
Process innovations  ***  *  **  ** 
(existing industries) 
Process innovations  *  **  ***  ** 
(basic sectors) 
The more stars the greater the propensity to innovate. 
4.  At first sight, it appears paradoxical that the wave of radical  innovations 
starts during the depression, just when the rate of profit is at its lowest level 
and the outlook for demand is gloomy.  Mensch (1979) gives a reply noting 
that when depression reaches its deepest point and enterprises have a very poor 
(or even negative) profit- ability,  they are faced  with a  choice: either they 
innovate,  bringing the rate of profit to a  normal level or they disappear<
8>. 
Innovations overcome depression. 
Kleinknecht (1987) completes the argument with the observation that, 
during the expansion, two contradictory factors come into play.  On the one 
hand, favourable prospects could encourage innovation."  On the other, as long 
as the established lines of  production are running well, firms have no incentive 
to bring out radically new products and find it more profitable to concentrate 
innovation and R&D efforts on gradual improvements within those lines.  In 
this situation, the aversion to radical change is reinforced by the fact that new 
technologies  often  represent  an  uncomfortable  substitution  giving  rise  to 
competition with  existing technologies  and  industries.  This explains why, -II-
when the first wave of radical innovations is  fully implemented, there is no 
other one to take over. 
How an economy moves out of this period depends on the intensity of 
risks  and  incentives:  a  prolonged  depression  with  market  saturation  and 
overcapacities for established products may force firms to find  new ways of 
creating a new technological paradigm. 
5.  For  Mandel  (1976;1980)  also,  the  technological  revolution  is 
fundamental in explaining the long waves, although he places this factor in a 
broader synthesis which is worth mentioning. 
The rate of profit is the gravitational centre of Mandel's analysis:  a 
long waves theory is. necessarily a theory of the accumulation of capital, and 
the relationship between the latter and the rate of profit is very close (Mandel 
1980  :  9).  The  massive  implementation  of radical  innovations  is  in  fact 
possible on two conditions:  1) an exceptional long term increase in the actual 
and expected average rate of profit; 2) a long term expansion of demand. 
The first condition depends on some exogenous factors and this results 
in the non-automatic characters of long waves.  They are: 
a sudden and large decrease in the  "organic composition of capital" < 9) 
by  a  massive  penetration  of  capital  in  sectors  or  regions  where  this 
composition  is  low,  or by  a decrease  of prices  for  fixed  capital  and  raw 
materials; 
an exceptional increase in the rate of surplus value(lO),  resulting,  for 
instance,  from a radical defeat of the  working class or from  an increase in 
work intensity; 
a sharp reduction in the rate of turnover of circulating capital (Mandel 
1976, t. I : 224-225). 
The long term  expansion of demand  results  from  the  rapid  pace  of 
capital accumulation induced by the increase in profitability as well as by an 
appreciable increase in real wages.  This wage  increase is compatible with -12-
profit's growth in that it does not exceed productivity gains. 
However, the factors which have determined the long expansion tend 
to tum into the opposite.  The generalisation of the technological revolution 
has  many  detrimental effects  on  profits,  since  the  organic  composition  of 
capital increases, technological rents  vanish and  productivity growth levels 
off.  This decrease in profitability is accentuated still more by an increase in 
prices of raw materials, the absorption of actual and potential excess labour 
supply as well as stronger worker resistance to new labour processes.  In these 
circumstances, wage increases necessarily lead to a fall in profitability; at the 
same time social conflicts and competition between enterprises become more 
acute01).  The  falling  rate  of  profit  breaks  the  pace  of  capital 
accumulation.  Unlike expansion- that, as already noted, essentially depends 
on exogenous factors -the transition to stagnation is thus endogenous. 
Referring to the third and fourth long waves,  Mandel (1980 : 32-33) 
also  shows  that  international  economic  relations  are  characterized  by  the 
presence of a hegemonic country and a stable monetary system during the long 
expansion while, during the stagnation,  there is  monetary instability and  an 
erosion of the dominant power. 
6.  Mensch (1979) and Van Duijn (1983) were among the first to make a 
systematic empirical test of the Schumpeterian theory of long waves produced 
by  radical  technological  changes.  Mensch's  analysis  was  deepened  by 
Marchetti (1980;  1988).  All obtained evidence favourable to the long wave 
approach.  Their results were  nevertheless  challenged  by  Solomou  (1986); 
recently,  Kleinknecht  (1990)  provided  new  evidence  which  neutralizes 
Solomou' s objections 
a)  Mensch studied a sample of 127 basic innovations from  1740 to 1960 
(Mensch  1979  :  124-129)(12); grouping them  by decades one can see clear 
peaks in the frequency of innovations during the depression periods. 
Mensch's statistical procedure was  severely criticized by Clark et al. -13-
(1981)  on  the  grounds  that  he  unjustifiably  omitted  a  number  of basic 
innovations and inventions and that there is a high degree of ambiguity on the 
dating of some invention and  innovations.  However,  the  revised estimate 
made by Clark et al.  did not invalidate the finding that innovations bunch but 
rather the  fact  that this  becomes  apparent during  the  depression  (see also 
point c below) 
b)  Mensch's  sample  was  further  analysed  by  Marchetti  (1980),  who 
obtained some other interesting results.  The first one is just an alternative way 
of presenting Mensch's findings:  Marchetti shows, in fact,  that in each long 
wave,  the number of basic innovations follow  a logistic curve.  The second 
result concerns the inventions which precede the innovations of the sample. 
It is usually thought that inventions do not follow  a particular time pattern. 
On the contrary,  Marchetti discovers  that inventions  are also  organized  in 
clusters which can be analysed logistically.  The only difference with respect 
to innovations is that the slope of the two logistics is not the same. 
Marchetti deepens his analysis by calculating, for each long wave, the 
innovation and invention midpoints, i.e. the dates when 50%  of innovations 
or inventions were in existence, as well as the innovation and invention "time 
constant", defined as the number of years taken for innovations (inventions) 
to  increase  from  10%  to  90%  of their  maximum  level.  His  results  are 
reported in table 3.  Several interesting features emerge. - 14-
Table 3 : Invention and innovation cycles 
(Marchetti 1980 : 272) 
Long waves 
First  Second  Third 
1.  Innovation midpoints 
2.  Invention midpoints 
3.  Cycle centres 
4. jt  between cycles 
centres 
5. ~t  between invention 
1828 
1775 
1802 
55 
52 
1880  1937 
1833  1905 
1857  1921 
64  (59) 
47  33 
Fourth 
(1992) 
(1968) 
(1980) 
(24) 
47~  33~  23~(16) 
and innovation midpoints 
6.  Innovation time constant 
7.  Invention time constant 
s.A t between innovation 
midpoints 
9. d  t between invention 
midpoints 
10. Saturation of market for 
primary energies 
120 
53 
58 
± 1800 
(wood, US) 
85  55  (38) 
57  55 
72  63 
± 1860  ± 1921  ± 1980 
(hay, US*)  (coal, world)  (oil, world) 
Innovation (invention) midpoints  =  dates when 50% of total innovations (inventions) of the long wave 
were in existence 
Cycle centre =  year at halfway between the invention and the innovation midpoints of the long wave 
Innovation (invention) time constant =  years required for innovations (inventions) to pass from  10%  to 
90% of their maximum level;&  =  number of years 
Figures in brackets are projections 
* primary source of energy for draught animals (pre-steam mechanical power) 
First,  the distance between  the  midpoints  of the  cycles  corresponds 
closely  to  the  conventional  duration  of long  waves  (4th  row of Table 3). 
Second,  there is  a sharp acceleration in both innovation and inventions.  It 
appears in fact from Table 3 that the average time lag between inventions and 
innovations diminishes sharply (5th row of Table 3) and that innovation takes 
less  time  to  bunch  (6th  row)(l3).  Curiously,  the  innovation  time constant 
of one wave coincides almost perfectly with the time lag between invention 
and  innovation  in  the  following  wave  (see  5th  and  6th  row  of Table 3). (4) 
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Furthermore, the introduction of new primary energy sources seems in tune 
with  the innovation  waves,  with  the  saturation of the  market  for primary 
energy coinciding with the midpoint of the cycles (1Oth and 3rd row of  Table 
3). 
c)  Van Duijn rectified some of  Mensch's conclusions by analysing a larger 
sample of  innovations, encompassing 160 major innovations introduced during 
the 19th and 20th centuries (Van Duijn 1983  : 174-179).  It appears that, in 
the first and second long waves, innovations were more abundant during the 
recovery phase (the decades 1836-1845 and 1883-1892) while, in the third long 
wave (1892-1948), the cluster of innovations appeared during the depression 
of the thirties.  In the present long wave innovations seem to be concentrated 
in  the  first  part  of  the  prosperity  phase  (1948-1957).  These  results, 
statistically  significant04),  induce  Van  Duijn  to  reject  the  existence  of a 
depression triggering effect (id.  : 181). 
d)  Solomou (1986) challenges Mensch's conclusions more radically.  In 
fact, relying on Mensch and Van Duijn' s data and applying similar statistical 
tests,  he infers that there are no regular clusters of innovations during the 
depression  phases.  In  his  v.iew,  radical  innovations  appear  at  random: 
"structural changes in the  twentieth  century have  been  confused  with  long 
waves"  (Solomou 1986: 111)<15>. 
e)  More recently,  Kleinknecht (1987 and  1990)  provided new empirical 
evidence which conclusively rejects the core of Solomou' s criticism.  In fact, 
analysing  a  larger sample  of "radical  innovations"06)  from  the  beginning 
of the nineteenth century to  1968,  Kleinknecht reached the  conclusion that 
Solomou's criticism is plausible only for the early period of capitalism (i.e. 
until  the  first  half of the  nineteenth  century).  From  1860  until  now  the 
evidence shows  a  clustering of radical  innovations  towards  the  end of the -16-
depression phase and at the beginning of  the expansion.  Thus, the period 1881 
to  1901  was  characterized  by  a  strong  performance  in terms  of radical 
innovations and the same happened for the period 1927 to 1962 (see  figure 
2, which is slightly simplified with respect to Kleinknecht's original one). 
FIGURE 2  : Frequency of  basic innovations 
(seven-year moving average) 
[Kleinknecht 1990 : 84] 
1it5  tl5o 
The scheme is the following (Kleinknecht 1990 : 83), where "+ + +" 
means upswing and "---" downswings<17). 
economic  wave  :  1873  --- 1893  +++  1913  --- 1939  +++  1974  --- ••• 
irvlOvation  wave 
12  years  lead  1861  --- 1881  +++  1901  --- 1927  +++  1962  --- ••• 
15  years  lead  1858  --- 1878  +++  1898  --- 1924  +++  1959  --- ••• -17-
ill.  A complementary approach: the role of institutions 
1.  It  is  widely  accepted  that  the  technological  revolution  that  will 
eventually generate the long upswing cannot be implemented without profound 
social, organizational and institutional changes.  For instance, Freeman and 
Perez emphasize that at the roots of each long wave there is a new  techno-
economic paradigm, something wider than the mere technological paradigm. 
They observe that  "the onset of prolonged recessionary  trends indicate the 
increasing degree of mismatch between the techno-economic sub-system and 
the  old  socio-institutional  framework.  It  shows  the  need  for  a  full-scale 
reaccommodation of social behaviour and institutions to suit the requirements 
and the potential of a shift which has already taken place to a considerable 
extent in some areas of the techno-economic sphere.  This reaccommodation 
occurs  as  a  result  of a  process  of political  search,  experimentation  and 
adaptation, but when it has been achieved, by a variety of social and political 
changes  at the  national  and  international  level,  the  resulting  good  •  match • 
facilitates the upswing phase of the long wave.  A climate of confidence for 
a surge of new investment is created through an appropriate combination of 
regulatory mechanisms which foster the full deployment of  the new paradigm". 
(Freeman and Perez .1988 : 59)(18). 
The crucial role of institutions  (broadly  defined)  was  systematically 
incorporated in a model of  long term development of  capitalist economies with 
the French theory of "regulation"  (see Boyer 1986, De Vroey,  1984-85 and 
Jessop  1990  for  a  survey)  and  its  equivalent  in  the  U.S.A,  the  "Social 
Structure of Accumulation"  (Bowles,  Gordon and  Weisskopf 1984;  1986). 
While the latter was devised to enrich the conventional explanation of long 
waves, the former developed independently and in a competing way from the 
long  waves  approach.  However,  long  waves  and  regulation  seem 
complementary rather than riv~ theories and it would be very useful to try to 
construct a synthesis of the two (Reati and Roland 1988). -18-
2.  The regulation theory (Aglietta 1976; Boyer and Mistral 1983; Lipietz 
1979)  studies  long  term  structural  change  from  a  systemic  viewpoint, 
considering  the  mechanisms  which  help  to  reproduce  the  basic  social 
relationships  of a  sytem  of historically  determined  institutional  forms<19). 
Institutions thus include not only the forms of state intervention and monetary 
and credit relationships but also the wage-labour nexus, forms of competition 
and the mode of accession to the international system.  The interdependence 
of the  productive  organization  and  the  consumption  norm  (or  mode  of 
consumption) is also emphasized. 
The starting point for the regulation theory is similar to that of  the long 
waves theory : a radical technical change (the assembly-line at the beginning 
of this century; automation and "Fordist" mass production in the fourth long 
wave)  which,  however,  is  not  viable  without  a  corresponding  change  in 
consumption.  Mass production must go hand in hand with mass consumption, 
and the latter must grow steadily.  It is then crucially important to have a wage 
bargaining procedure which allows a parallel and foreseeable growth of real 
wage and productivity.  Social consensus is also essential.  Social security (the 
"indirect wage") makes it much easier to attain this consensus and the scope 
increases for State intervention to facilitate  capital accumulation.  The long 
expansion is thus made possible by an "efficient" mode of regulation<20>. 
According to the regulation theory, post  -1945 growth was associated 
with a regime of intensive accumulation ("Fordism  ") with mass consumption; 
from the second half of the 19th century until the first world war, capitalism 
was characterized by extensive accumulation and, during the 1920s and 1930s, 
there was intensive accumulation without mass consumption ("Taylorism"). 
With the extensive accumulation regime the consumer goods sector is 
rather underdeveloped, wage goods being largely provided by the family with 
the result that the demand directed to the market is limited.  By contrast, the 
intensive accumulation regime with mass consumption is based on the parallel 
growth of the  capital goods and  consumer goods  sectors.  The supply  and -19-
demand for consumer goods are transformed: wage goods are produced using 
mass production techniques and the volume and composition of  demand adapt 
accordingly. Wage goods are now entirely bought on the market. 
A "structural crisis" like that of  the Seventies and Eighties occurs when 
the functioning of regulation conflicts with existing institutional forms, which 
then  have  to  be  abandoned  or bypassed.  The  contradictions  which  have 
undermined the mode of  regulation during the last two decades were, first, the 
slowdown in productivity growth which eroded the basis of mass consumption 
and,  second,  public finance  deficits  which  called  into  question  the  welfare 
state, a fundamental piece of social consensus.  The institutions for collective 
bargaining  were  no  longer  effective,  inflation  became  a  "toxic  drug", 
profitability deteriorated, the established hierarchy among nations was upset, 
etc. Economic crises manifest themselves as crises of regulation. 
Long stagnation will end when the system succeeds in adopting a new 
accumulation regime, entirely different from the previous one, and in finding 
an appropriate mode of regulation.  As in the case of  long waves, the outcome 
is always uncertain,  since transition to a new  mode of regulation cannot be 
guaranteed in advance. 
3.  For the  "Social Structure of Accumulation"  theorists,  long upswings 
depend on a periodically reconstructed set of  institutions (the "Social Structure 
of Accumulation") which provides the economic, social and political stability 
required  for  favourable  profit expectations  and  therefore  for  rapid  capital 
accumulation.  Radical  changes  in the  institutional  framework  are thus  the 
necessary  conditions  for  a  technological  revolution  and  the  ensuing  long 
upswing. 
The erosion of these  institutions  sets  the  stage  for economic crises: 
business cycles are unable to  restore the high growth trend of the previous 
phase. 
Bowles,  Gordon and  Weisskopf (1986)  and  Gordon (1989)  provided -20-
empirical evidence for their theory considering the postwar U.S. economy. For 
this purpose, they devised some statistical proxies of the institutional features 
which prevailed in that period, such as:  "the capital-labour accord", the "pax 
americana"  and  "the capital-citizen  accord".  Adding  these variables to  the 
variables reflecting technology and capacity utilization they obtained a more 
adequate  econometric account  of productivity,  profitability and  investment 
behaviour. 
IV.  Some other features of long waves 
Two other elements of long waves are important in order to understand 
the present situation:  the evolution of profitability and the behaviour of the 
business cycle. 
1.  With regard to the rate of profit, the fundamental question is to know 
whether the level and evolution of profitability are a cause or an effect of the 
long waves in production<21).  Whereas,  for the upper turning point of the 
wave, we can easily admit that the decline in profitability is one of the main 
causes of the transition to stagnation, things are less clear for the upswing. 
There  are  three  conflicting  interpretations.  According  to  Mandel 
(1980), for a new phase of long term growth to start, an exceptional and stable 
increase in profitability must first take place.  Mensch also considers that the 
rate of profit is the cause of the technological revolution and the upswing, but 
for differents reasons.  Firms introduce radical  innovations not because the 
rate of profit is high but because it is extremely low and depression is at its 
deepest point.  The other Schumpeterians (e.g.  Van  Duijn) believe that the 
evolution  of profitability  is  the  effect  of the  long  wave  movement  :  the 
technological revolution comes first; it  induces expansion and, with expansion, 
profitability increases. -21-
It is not possible, from the available evidence on the long term dynamic 
of the rate of profit (Shaikh 1989; Dumenil, Glick, Rangel, 1987; Poletayev 
1992), to settle the question conclusively.  However, for the purpose of this 
paper, it is not necessary to establish exactly the direction taken by causality. 
It is merely enough to know the broad evolution of profitability during the 
phases of the long wave movement, particularly during the recovery. 
The above mentioned studies show what follows (Fig. 3) : 
a) long stagnation is characterized by three separate movements in the rate of 
profit: 
firstly, a very strong decline during the depression, pushing profitability 
to its lowest level; 
towards the end of the depression, profitability starts to recover, under 
the "curative" effect of the business cycle. The weakest enterprises go 
out of business,  those who survive restructure and,  in this way, the 
profitability of the sector improves; 
this upward trend continues and accelerates during the recovery.  As 
noted  above,  it is  not  yet  clear  whether  this  is  the  result  of the 
technological  revolution  or rather  the  outcome  of some  exogenous 
factor; 
b) during the long expansion profitability develops in stages : 
during the prosperity profitability usually stays at high and even using 
levels; 
during the recession the rate of  profit starts to fall and this produces the 
turning point in the production trend  : thus the effects of one of the 
factors  underpinning  the expansion are exhausted.  There are many 
causes of this decline in profitability  : social conflicts and excessive 
wage increases,  an overaccumulation  of capital  in relation  to  profit 
opportunities,  a decline in productivity growth,  tight labour markets 
favouring wage increases, etc. < 22> rp 
'I 
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FIGURE 3 :  The rate of  profit in the long wave 
(Reati, 1990 : 23) 
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2.  The long wave movement moulds the shape of the business cycle.  In 
fact, during the long expansion the prosperity phase of  the business cycle tends 
to  be  long  and/or  more  accentuated  and  the  recession  short  and/or  less 
intensive<23).  During  the  long  upswing,  the  short  term  recession  rarely 
leads  to  a  drop  in  the  level  of production;  instead,  there  is  merely  a 
deceleration of growth<24>.  During the long  stagnation,  the business cycle 
is characterized by short (and/or mild) periods of  prosperity and long and deep 
recessions, often giving rise to a fall  in the level of activity. 
These characteristics of the  business  cycle  in conjunction  with  long 
waves  were  noted  early:  Kondratieff had  pointed  them  out as  far  as  1926 
(Kondratieff 1935  : 111) and L.H. Dupriez in 1947 (Dupriez 1966 vol.  II  : 
253-257)<25).  Dupriez  bases  his  explanation  on  the  evolution  of  the (5) 
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demand for money and credit:  "le mouvement long apparait (ainsi) comme 
conditionnant le mouvement cyclique; par son action sur Ia demande monetaire 
et sur le credit,  Ia  hausse fondamentale eloigne le moment oil  le processus 
cumulatif de hausse se resout en crise, rapproche le moment ou le reajustement 
de Ia depression est suffisant pour donner cours a  un nouvel essor; Ia baisse 
fondamentale ecourte Ia hausse en creant rapidement les conditions de repli et 
prolonge  Ia  stagnation"  (Dupriez  1966  :  255)<26>.  Along  the  same  line, 
Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983 : 152 and foil.) speak of "reproductive" 
and  "non-reproductive"  business cycles.  The former endogenously restore 
conditions for rapid accumulation without requiring fundamental changes in the 
structure of the accumulation process.  In the non-reproductive cycle, on the 
contrary,  a downturn does  not  correct itself endogenously  and  therefore it 
requires basic changes in the institutions that regulate the accumulation process 
and  establish  the  conditions  for  profitability.  Long  swing  expansions  are 
characterized by reproductive cycles, long swing crises by non-reproductive 
cycles  (id.:  152-153).  The  fact  that  a  reproductive  cycle  becomes 
nonreproductive signals an erosion of  the effectiveness of  the institutions of  the 
"Social structure of accumulation" (id.  : 154). -24-
PARTll 
UNDERSTANDING THE PRESENT SITUATION 
The main aspect that throws light on the nature of the present recovery 
is the technological revolution in computer and information technologies which 
started in the seventies.  The evidence that appears will be supplemented by 
two other elements giving indirect a support to the conclusion that we are now 
in  the  final  phase  of the  long  stagnation.  They  are  :  the  recovery  in 
profitability and the different behaviour of the business cycte<27). 
I.  The technological revolution of the Seventies 
1.  In a recent contribution Marchetti (1988) presents an impressive series 
of graphs concerning a wide spectrum of activities and sectors : all show a 
logistic  curve  path,  which  is  in  strong  accordance  with  the  long  wave 
periodicity.  These waves indicate that, in most cases, the initial impulse of  the 
present long  wave  will  reach  saturation  around  1995.  If,  in  a  particular 
country or activity, the process started later, saturation always arrives towards 
the  end  of the  general  cycle:  latecomers  have  shorter  time  constraints 
(Marchetti, 1988 :. 3).  Marchetti maintains that "we are now witnessing the 
1984-2002  innovation  wave  to  be  centred  in  1993"  and  that  "our  ... 
[stagnation] should end in 1995" (id.  : 2). 
Although Marchetti's exercise deserves careful consideration, I think 
that we  must avoid  mechanically extrapolating past tendencies.  If we can 
safely say that 1995 will be the year of saturation for the impulse of  the 1940s, 
we need some good reason to infer that a fifth long wave will start around that 
year.  The question, then, is whether there are signs of a new technological 
revolution which coul<l produce the economic upswing in the 1990s<28>. 
2.  In a period of intense technological change, it is difficult to tell which -25-
innovation(s) will take the form of a technological revolution, since it is only 
in retrospect with a certain time-lag that one can decide which are the major 
or  minor  innovations.  Nonetheless,  we  are  now  witnessing  some  strong 
similarities with the long wave mechanism. 
The innovations in the field of computer and information technology 
which developed in the 1970s in connection with the large scale application of 
micro-electronics  present  the  characteristics  of a  technological  revolution. 
They are, in fact, innovations that radically change production methods in an 
increasing number of industries and services; this change will be even more 
fundamental  when the CIM (computer integrated  manufacturing)  and CAD 
(computer assisted design) techniques are further improved and generalized. 
Increasing computerization and  use of information technologies helps 
both  to  create  new  industries  and  to  rejuvenate  old  ones<29).  This 
innovation can not only push automation to its extreme limits but also: 
reduces the scope for technical economies of scale, since it lowers the 
minimum optimum scale of plant; 
allows for greater flexibility, since the same equipment could produce 
a range of differentiated products; 
provides higher quality by adding "intelligence" to products 
permits a decentralization of production; 
extends the  "limits to growth"  by helping to  overcome the obstacles 
imposed by scarcity of natural resources 
has a strong potential impact on labour organization and labour relations 
within  the  firm.  In  some  instances,  direct  labour  is  almost  completely 
eliminated;  in some others,  the workers can profitably accomplish a whole 
range of operations, giving them a large view and control over the production 
process.  In any case, the qualifications required are entirely different<30). 
The emerging  techno-economic  paradigm  thus  makes  it possible  to 
overcome the limitations of the previous one at the productive as well as at the 
organizational level.  The first aspect refers to the diseconomies of scale and -26-
inflexibility of  dedicated assembly-line plant and to the obstacles met by mass 
production with its intensive use of  energy and materials.  The organizational 
limitations  come  from  the  hierarchical  departmentalization  of  large 
corporations, which can now be overcome by integrating design, management, 
production and marketing into one system  < 31). 
As was the case for the previous long waves, the present technological 
revolution possesses its specific key factor (the  "chips") available in almost 
unlimited quantities at a falling relative price. 
Finally, it is easy to see that the computer and information technology 
revolution fits in with Van Duijn's scheme (table 1)  in the sense that it is a 
process innovation appearing during the depression in an existing industry. 
3.  Computer and information technology was accompanied, in the eighties, 
by a  cluster of radical innovations<32>.  They started with  the introduction 
of  new materials (optical fibres) and products (laser), developed independently 
of the computer innovation,  and  we  are  now  witnessing an interesting and 
promising combination with the computer (telematics, bio-informatics, sensors 
and  switches).  The convergence of information and  computer technologies 
adds another significant example (OECD 1989 : 152).  Also, the establishment 
of networks between information technology-based equipment leeds to a wide 
creation of knowledge and know-how in  the economy which encourages the 
cumulative adoption of many small innovations (id.:  15). 
Biotechnology is at least as revolutionary as the computer and micro-
processors.  Its  potential  impact in  agriculture  is  enormous,  as  genetically 
transformed plants could solve the famine problem of the Third World.  In 
industry,  the  scope  for  biotechnology  is  more  restricted,  even  though 
production  methods  in  a  wide  range  of sectors,  such  as  pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals, food and drink, will change drastically and it could also be possible 
to  apply  biotechnology  to  mineral  extraction<33>.  However,  it  is  quite 
unlikely that biotechnology could be the basis for a technological revolution -27-
which would pull the economy out of the present long stagnation because it is 
not yet perfected.  For industry and services of the industrialized countries, 
most of  the far-reaching innovations derived from biotechnology will probably 
be  implemented  at  the  beginning  of  the  next  century,  when  the 
microelectronics paradigm has already become established and produced its 
economic effects. 
4.  Adequate empirical evidence on the  present technological revolution 
would provide data on the development of the  main  "carrier branches", on 
induced growth sectors as well as on the infrastructures which facilitate the use 
of  new processes and products everywhere and create appropriate externalities. 
This would cover: 
as main branches: computers, software, electronic capital goods; 
as  induced  growth  sectors:  advanced  machine  tools,  measuring, 
precision  and  control  instruments,  industrial  robotics  and  flexible 
manufacturing  systems,  "avionics", < 34)  telecommunication  equipment,  data 
banks, information services; 
as infrastructures: digital telecommunications networks, satellites; 
as  other  radical  innovations:  optical  fibres,  new  ceramics,  fine 
chemicals. 
However,  the  available  data  are  far  from  being  exhaustive:  new 
products and  activities do  not fit  into  the  old  statistical  classifications and, 
moreover, they are lumped together with other traditional items.  The 3-digit 
Eurostat data base VISA,  covering industrial enterprises with  20 and  more 
employees, could provide useful information. Unfortunately, this data base is 
not coherent with the national accounts, in which the industrial branches are 
at 2-digit and,  all things considered, I prefered to  rely on the latter source. 
The two branches of national accounts whose coverage is not too far from the 
sectors  at  the  core  of the  technological  revolution  are  :  office  and  data-
processing machines, precision and optical instruments (NACE R25 code 23) -28-
and electrical goods (NACE R25 code 25).  Taken together, they cover the 
"main  branches"  and  part  of  the  induced  growth  sectors,  since 
telecommunications equipment is included in the electrical goods branch.  As 
a rough proxy of information services based on the new technologies I have 
taken the "communication services" (NACE R25 code 67).  Table 4 indicates 
that the "new technological paradigm"  is clearly under way.  In fact,  if the 
growth of  value added or investment in the "main branches" is compared with 
that in manufacturing from 1975 to 1989, we see that, in all countries, the said 
branches were much more dynamic than the average.  In the UK the growth 
of the office and data-processing machines was particularly strong.  In a few 
cases (UK and Japan) the communication services grew less than the average. 
The medium term outlook is even more favourable.  According to BIPE 
et al.  (1991), for the 1989-95 period the average annual growth rate of  output 
at constant prices in EUR-12 will be : 8.6%  for semiconductors;  6.4% for 
data  processing  equipment;  15.0%  for  software  services;  8.2%  for 
tecommunications equipment and 6.5 for telecommunication services, whereas, 
for GOP and total manufacturing, forecast growth is 2.8% per year. 
Concerning the advanced machine  tools~ we should note that in 1978 
they  represented, in the EC, less than 10%  of the sector's production value 
whereas by 1988, this share amounted to 40%  and it is expected that in the 
second half of the 1990s it will level out at 65%  (Atkins 1990: 41-43). -29-
TABLE 4 : Indications of the spreading of the technological 
revolution,  1975-1989@ata at constant prices] 
(base year 1985) 
Varia- Office and data proc. mach.;  Electrical goods 
ble  instruments 
Rei.  % share
1  Rei.  % share
2 
growth  I 
growth  I  index
1  1975  1989  index•  1975  1989 
Germany  VA  109.'2  2.7  3.0  138.1  10.4  14.4 
lnv.  103.6  3.9  4.1  126.4  9.4  11.9 
France  VA  140.7  3.3  4.6  137.5  7.5  10.3 
Inv.  152.0  2.7  4.1  112.3  6.7  7.5 
Italy  VA  150.~  1.8'  2.7  123.8
4  6.5
5  8.0 
Inv.
4  98.3
7  2.5  2.5  145.4
7  6.7  9.7 
UK  VA  310.4  1.1  3.6  116.1  8.6  10.0 
Inv.  219.2  1.5  3.3  139.3  5.7  8.0 
USA'  VA'  139.1  5.7  7.9  143.4  6.3  9.0 
Inv.'  171.7  4.3  7.4  235.4  4.5  10.6 
Japan  VA'  140.0  2.7  3.8  S27.4  3.4  17.7 
Inv.'  144.7  3.4  4.9  286.2  5.8  16.7 
.. 
Source: EUROSTAT, National accounts ESA (sectoral data base) 
Communication services 
Rel.  "  share' 
growth  t  index•  1975  1989 
141.6  3.6  5.1
7 
136.8
7  5.2  7.2
7 
201.1  3.0  6.0 
81.0  5.3  4.3 
140.5
4  2.3
5  3.3 
125.<t  5.7
5  7.1
7 
79.2  4.9  3.9 
99.1  7.0  7.07 
128.7  4.3  5.5' 
86.0  9.1  7.8' 
74.0  3.1  2.3
7 
58.4  4.7  2.8' 
1  Obtained by dividing the index for the individual branch with respect to total manufacturing (for the two industrial 
branches) or to market services (for the communication services branch) 
2  With respect to manufacturing 
3  With respect to market services 
4  Base year 1980 
5  Year 1980 
6  Final year 1987 
7  Final year 1988 -30-
According to sectoral experts (Hom, Klodt and Saunders, in Sharp 1985 ed.  : 
55), in industrialized countries advanced machine tools have now passed the 
first  stage  of the  logistic  life-cycle  function  and  have  entered  into  the 
exponential growth phase. 
It is  interesting to  note  that  the  reference  to  long  waves  and  to  the 
technological  revolution  enables  us  to  explain  what  until  now  was  just 
considered  as  fact  :  the  dichotomy,  in  the  economic evolution of the  last 
seventeen  years,  between  a  small  group  of Industrial  branches  for  which 
demand remained buoyant despite sluggish economic growth, and the others 
(Buigues and Goybet 1989).  At a 2-digit level of classification these strong-
demand  sectors  are:  office  and  data  processing  equipment;  electrical  and 
electronic equipment and supplies; chemicals and  pharmaceuticals. The first 
two correspond to  the  main  "carrier branches"  of the present technological 
revolution while the third branch,  whose performance essentially reflect the 
growth  of fine  chemicals,  is  probably  linked  with  the  cluster  of radical 
innovations of the 1980s. 
5.  We  have  seen in  table 3 that,  historically,  there  was  an appreciable 
shortening of the time lag between invention and  innovation  : mechanically 
extrapolating past trends 1992 should coincide with the implementation of  50% 
of total innovations  that will  produce the  fifth  long  wave (table 3, row  1). 
Things are not going faster because there are several obstacles to the diffusion 
of the computer and information technology innovations (OECD 1989 : 170-
176).  The  first,  and  perhaps  the  most  important  one,  is  institutional. 
Managers  are  not  yet  prepared  to  make  radical  changes  in  the  firm's 
organization and production processes in order to adopt the new technologies. 
Even when it is decided that the firm should change, it is often difficult to find 
"blue or white collar" workers with the appropriate skills to operate the new 
equipment. 
The second obstacle to diffusion is technical: the new technologies  are (6) 
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not yet as perfected as the producers maintain.  The CIM (Computer integrated 
manufacturing) technologies, for instance, are still in their early research phase 
and we will probably have to wait for about a decade for the emergence of  the 
supplying industries and the effective demand (Arcangeli 1990). 
Thirdly, the new technologies are still too expensive.  Even though the 
computer revolution started in the 1970s, for many applications it is still too 
young for dramatic cuts in the price of new equipment to be possible. For the 
time being, the expansion of  demand is not strong enough to allow enterprises 
to recover the cost of the new investment in a short period of time. 
Finally,  an  essential  requirement  for  the  international  diffusion  of the 
information technologies, is the provision of a wideband telecommunications 
infrastructure; this condition, which calls for massive investment, has not yet 
been met in Europe. -32-
n.  The recovery in profitability 
Two main questions will be addressed.  The first concerns the general 
evolution  of this  indicator  :  if it  accorded  with  the  long  wave  theory 
predictions, this would be another factor supporting the hypothesis that our 
economies are in the second phase of  the long stagnation.  The second question 
refers to the nature of the recovery which will take place : is it just the result 
of the  business  cycle  or is  it also  an  incipient effect of the  technological 
revolution ? 
a) Methodological aspects 
1.  The most appropriate indicator of profitability is the rate of profit of 
capital advanced,  i.e.  net fixed  capital plus the  stock of circulating capital. 
This measure of profitability is superior to the rate of profit of fixed capital 
not only  because it provides  a more  realistic level  of profitability but also 
because  it takes  into  consideration  the  influence,  on  the  rate of profit,  of 
changes  in  the  relative  scale  of circulating  capital<35>.  At  the  statistical 
level,  the  stock of raw  materials,  finished  products and  works  in progress 
forms a close approximation to the stock of circulating capital.  Unfortunately 
these  data  are  not  always  easily  available  and,  in  any  case,  they  are  not 
included in the EUROST  AT  national accounts,  which is  the source utilized 
here.  For this reason, the rate of profit (rp) was calculated with respect to the 
net capital stock only, according to the following formula: where:  S  -
-33-
PYA 
PK 
(1) 
net profits,  current prices  = VA - W  = net operating 
surplus<36) 
K  =  net capital stock at mid-year replacement prices 
VA~ 
PDT  = 
VAV:::: 
L  = 
QT 
KV 
PVA and PK = 
net value added, current prices 
productivity of labour =  VA V  /L 
net value added at constant prices 
total employment 
indicator of mechanization  =  KV  /L 
- net capital stock at constant prices 
implicit prices of value added and fixed capital 
(2) 
(3) 
We see that the evolution of profitability depends upon three factors : 
the profit share SN  A 
an  indicator  of the  efficiency  of capital  accumulation.  The  ratio 
QT  /PDT (capital/  output ratio) compares, in fact,  the investment to increase 
mechanisation (QT, i.e. capital per worker) with its results in terms of labour 
productivity.  An  increase  in  this  ratio  exerts  a  downward  pressure  on 
profitability as too much  capital is  required  to  obtain a  certain increase in 
productivity 
the relative prices of value added with respect to the prices of fixed 
capital.  The evolution  of PV  A/PK is  first  of all  explained  by  different 
performances of  labour productivity in the sector in question as compared with 
the sector producing the capital goods for it. 
2.  For the present investigation it is interesting to ascertain whether the 
recovery in profitability that will appear is mainly due to the business-cycle or -34-
whether it depends on other factors, in particular the technological revolution. 
Short-term fluctuations of activity influence profitability in two ways: by the 
varying degree of capacity utilization and by the restructuring induced by the 
declining phase of the business cycle. 
The first effect depends on the  so-called  "overhead labour":  certain 
types of labour (administrative,  supervisory,  maintenance) are employed in 
proportion to the capacity of  the enterprise, while others (production workers) 
are used in accordance with the actual output.  When production temporarily 
declines, labour-hours of production workers are proportionally reduced; for 
the other types of labour, an analogous cut is not easily made, and this raises 
the unit cost of production and reduces profits. 
The other influence on profitability comes from the "curative" effect of 
the business cycle.  During the recession, some enterprises go out of  business, 
the remaining restructure themselves and, in this way, increase their rate of 
profit. 
To appreciate the importance of the "overhead labour" effect, one can 
rectify the rate of profit by dividing it by the rate of capacity utilization and 
then  compare the evolution of the  rate of profit with  the evolution of the 
corrected ratio.  By  doing  so,  we  compare the  profitability resulting from 
potential (full-capacity) labour productivity (PDT*) with actual performance. 
In fact, defining the rate of capacity utilization (cu) as:  cu  =  VAVN  AV{fJ,.) 
where  VA  V*  is  potential  output at  constant prices<37>,  the  rectified  rate 
of profit (rp*) is : 
rp*  =  rp  =  _§__  PDT*  PYA 
cu  VA  QT  PK 
(5) 
where PDT*= VAV*/L 
Potential output (VA V*) can be derived from the published figures on 
the rate of capacity utilization : -35-
VAV* =  VAV/cu  (6) 
With regard to the second effect of the business cycle, one should be 
aware  that,  unfortunately,  it cannot  be  statistically  separated  from  other 
influences, e.g. the repercussion of the technological revolution.  The causes 
of the recovery of profitability can thus be judged only on a more qualitative 
base. 
b)  Evidence 
3.  As appears in Tables 5 and figures 4 to 8, during the long stagnation 
profitability followed,  in all countries, an evolution similar to that predicted 
by the long waves theory.  In fact, in most cases, the fall in profitability ended 
in 1981, i.e. towards the end of the depression phase and, from  1982, there 
was an important recovery.  In Italy (manufacturing) (fig. 6) and UK (industry 
plus  transport  and  communications)  (fig.  7),  the  increase  in  profitability 
appeared as early as 1976; the USA economy also experienced a recovery in 
profitability from the beginning of the 1980s (fig. 8).  Japan departs from this 
general trend because, from 1976 to 1988, profitability was flat (table 5 and 
fig.  9). -36-
TABLE 5 :  The evolution of the rate of profit 
annual  % change1  Levels(%) 
period  I % change1  1960  1  1970  1  1981  I 1987 
GERMANY 
manufacturing  1960-81  -4.44  41.1  27.5  12.5  21.92 
1981-90  4.43 
ind.  + transp.  1960-82  -3.36  28.0  21.7  11.7  14.5 
+ comrnunic.  1982-87  3.31 
FRANCE 
manufacturing  1960-81  -2.85  18.7  18.8  9.7  16.32 
1981-90  3.28 
ind.  + transp.  1970-82  -5.58  18.0  9.5  11.5
3 
+ communic.  1982-85  5.17 
ITALIE 
manufacturing  1960-75  -4.11  34.1  29.5  14.<f  18.72 
1975-90  0.01 
ind.  + transp.  1960-82  -3.97  32.8  32.1  15.0  19.47 
+ communic.  1982-90  4.31 
UNITED KINGDOM 
manufacturing  1960-81  -7.51  45.7  25.9  9.7  21.()2 
1981-90  9.23 
manufacturing  1960-81  -7.21  16.3  10.4  2.4  11.9 
(OECD)5  1981-87  19.47 
ind.  + transp.  1972-75  -21.01  19.<r  8.54  18.8
7 
+ comrnunic.  1975-88  5.49 
ind.  + transp.  1960-75  -5.36  ll.8  8.2  7.1  12.7 
+ comrnunic.  1975-87  6.91 
(0ECD)5 
NFE (OECD)5  1960-75  -7.18  13.5  7.5  4.9  9.2 
1975-87  4.91 
USA 
manufacturing  1960-82  -4.63  26.9  19.4  12.8  16.4 
(OECD)5  1982-87  4.10 
JAPAN 
NFE(OECDi  1970-75  -14.77  34.8  16.3  15.7
7 
1975-88  0.17 
Source  :  EUROSTAT  (U'\less otherwise indicated)  :  sectoral data base and  data base on  capital stock.  For  1989  and  1990 
data on  capital  stock are provisional.  NFA  =non farm  non  financial  enterprises. 
2 
Average  annual  rate of  change  of  the exponential  trend  (bx100)  obtained by a  spline regression of  the  function  : 
x =  a  ew,  or  lg  x = lg  a  +  bt,  where  x  represents the  rate of  profit and  t  time  (1,  2 •.•• ). 
For  the second  sub-period,  figures  refer to the  rate of  change  calculated on  the basis of the changes  in slope of 
the  regression.  The  ratio of  the parameters  to their standard errors are always  higher  than 2. 
Year  1990.  Data  for  this year  is provisional. 
3  Year  1985. 
4  Year  1975. 
s  OECO.  Profits at factor costs instead of .arket prices.  Moreover,  OECO  definition of Manufacturing  is that of  the 
old systeta of  nat h)f'Wtl  accoc..nts  and  thus  differs from  ESC. 
6  Year  19n. 
7  Year  1988. F
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The rise of the eighties brought the rate of profit in manufacturing to 
the early seventies level. 
Note that the evolution of the rate of profit in UK is heavily dependent 
on the method of  estimating the capital stock.  In fact, if we take OECD data, 
we see not only a big difference in level but also that the long term decline is 
less accentuated than it appears from Eurostat data, and the rise since 1982 is 
much  greater (table 5).  According  to  the  OECD  source,  the  1987  level 
(11.9%) is slightly higher than in 1962, and not too far from the cyclical peak 
of 1964 (13.5%). 
4.  Figures 11  and  13  show that, during the last twenty years, short term 
fluctuations  in  the  degree  of capacity  utilization  had  no  influence  on  the 
evolution of the rate of profit in British and French manufacturing. It is only 
in  Germany  and  Italy  that  this  factor  had  a  more  discernible  influence, 
although it remained within a narrow range (figures 10 and 12). 
5.  Let us now examine the determinants of  the evolution of profitability in 
manufacturing~ splitting the rate of profit into its components as in formula 1. 
Of course, it should be not considered that this exercise shows a true causality 
because the second relationship of formula 1 is an identity: as such, it offers 
no single unique behavioural explanation.  Nevertheless this analysis provides 
some further insights into the long-term movement of profitability. 
Table 6 shows that, in all countries, the factor which most influenced 
the  evolution  of profitability  was  income  distribution.  During  the  long 
expansion and the depression phase of the long wave, the decrease in profit 
share (SN  A) pushed the rate of  profit downward;  during the second phase of 
the long stagnation (the recovery), the opposite movement prevailed and,  as 
it can be seen from table 6 comparing the increase of the rate of profit with 1
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TABLE 6 :  The rate of  profit and its components in manufacturing industry 
(average annual rate of change of the exponential trend)(l) 
'Country  Period  rp  SNA  QT/PDT  PVA/PK 
Germany  1960-81  -4.44  -3.36  0.61  -0.47 
1981-90  4.43  3.11  -0.41  0.91 
France  1960-81  -2.85  -3.19  -0.95  -0.60 
1981-90  3.28  4.48  1.03  -0.17* 
Italy  1960-75  -4.11  -3.12  -1.47  -2.45 
1975-90  0.01  1.45  -0.14  -1.58 
United  1960-81  -7.51  -4.41  1.91  -1.19 
Kingdom  1981-90  9.23  7.32  -1.67  0.24 
(1)  Calculated as in Table 3 (spline regressions).  Instance where the ratio of 
the parameter to its standard error is less than 2 is indicated with an 
asterisk. 
the  increase  of profit  share,  the  improvement  in  profitability  was  mainly 
determined by the parallel movement of the profit share. 
The net effect of  capital accumulation (ratio QT  /PDT) had an important 
effect on profitability both during the long expansion and the long stagnation 
in UK manufacturing : until  1981  the sharp increase in this ratio depressed 
profitability; from 1982 this trend was reversed, thus reinforcing the upward 
pressure on the rate of profit already stemming from the profit share (figure 
15).  In other words, during the long expansion and the first part of the long 
stagnation capital accumulation was inefficient, as more and more equipment 
was required to improve productivity; it was only during the recovery phase 
of the stagnation that capital accumulation became efficient, since the increase 
in the degree of mechanization (QT) was associated with larger increases in 
labour productivity. -44-
In  France  and  Italy  the  net  influence  of capital  accumulation  was 
relatively  great in  the  Sixties,  when  it  exerted  a  favourable  influence  on 
profitability (fig. 13 and 14).  Conversely~ in Germany the ratio QT/PDT had 
only a minor effect on profitability both during the long expansion and  the 
long stagnation (fig.  12). 
The evolution of the relative prices of value added (PV  A/PK) had  a 
negative effect on profitability, except in Germany and  UK,  for the period 
1981-1990.  This adverse effect was greater in Italy.  This means that, because 
of  internal and international competition, manufacturing was unable to pass on 
the increasing cost of plant and  equipment in its  selling prices.  The main 
beneficiary  was  the  construction  industry<38),  a  sector  protected  from 
international competition. 
6.  Let us  now compare profitability in  the branches at the core of  the 
technological revolution with profitability in manufacturing.  This will provide 
further information on the nature of the recovery in the rate of profit already 
noted. 
Table 7 shows that, in Germany and the United Kingdom, the increase 
in  profitability  of the  electrical  goods  sector  was  much  greater  than  in 
manufacturing while, in France and Italy, the trend of the rate of profit was 
declining.  In office and data processing machines, profitability was growing 
in the UK (although by less than in total manufacturing) while, in the other 
countries, it was declining (Germany) or stationary (France, Italy). 
A comparison of these results with what emerges from table 4 in terms 
of output allows us to conclude that, in Germany and the UK, the increase in 
industrial  profitability  is  dependent  on  the  technological  revolution.  The 
electrical goods  sector,  in  fact,  accounts  for  more  than  10%  of industrial 
output in these countries  : its  profitability has  therefore a direct dimension 
effect on the performances of industry.  In the other countries, the influence 
of the business cycle predominates. F
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TABLE 7 :  The  evolution  of profitability  in  the  branches  at the  core  of the  technological 
revolution 
(average annual rate of change of the exponential trend) 
Periods  annual % change
1  Levels 
1975  1981  1990 
GERMANY 
office and data proc. machi- 1975-90  -7.58'  24.3  20.6  14.5 
nes; instruments 
electrical goods  1975-81  -7.31  17.6  8.9  25.9 
1981-90  8.21 
manufacturingl  1975-81  -6.80  17.9  12.5  21.9 
1981-90  5.54 
FRANCE 
office and data proc. machi- 1975-90  -0.64*'  34.5  22.5  25.4 
nes; instruments 
electrical goods  1975-82  -8.68  34.6  21.3  18.8 
1982-90  -1.82 
manufacturing  1975-82  -5.82  12.6  9.7  16.3 
1982-90  7.17 
ITALY 
office and data proc. machi- 1975-90  1.74*'  15.7  34.7  30.4 
nes; instruments 
electrical goods  1975-90  -1.82*'  11.3  17.3  11.2 
manufacturing  1975-90  1.32  14.0.  18.5  18.7 
UNITED KINGDOM 
office and data proc. machi- 1975-90  2.70'  19.50  22.50  29.7 
nes; instruments 
electrical goods  1975-90  7.71'  4.8  10.6  20.2 
manufacturing  1975-90  4.39  10.1  9.7  21.0 
Source : EUROST  AT : sectoral data base 
Calculated as  in Table I.  Spline  regressions  where  there  is  a  sub-
period.  The asterisk has the same meaning. 
2 
3 
The differences with respect to the growth rates reported in Table 4 are 
due to the "harmonica effect"  resulting from the spline regression. 
For this variable there is  no break in the trend. -48-
m.  The behaviour of the business cycles 
1.  This aspect plays a subsidiary role with respect to the other two points 
developed in paragraphs I and IT above.  Indeed, the finding in that the present 
business cycle is following an atypical pattern does not, by itself, prove that 
the  underlying long term  trend is changing.  However, if we  consider that 
there  are  two  other  arguments  supporting  this  thesis  (the  technological 
revolution  and  the  recovery  in profitability),  the  business-cycle  argument 
reinforces the conclusions that can be drawn from  the previous stage of the 
analysis. 
For this  purpose  I shall  compare  the  length  of the  prosperity phase 
which started around 1982 with the same phases of the previous cycles. This 
exercise will also provide an opportunity of verifying whether the evidence 
available supports or contradicts the predictions of  the theory that the business 
cycle pattern varies according to the phases of the long wave.  Jldentifying 
peaks and troughs of the business cycles presents almost the same difficulties 
and  uncertainties  as  detecting long  waves.  Here too  the  trend  elimination 
procedure is  crucial,  because it influences  the dates  of peaks  and  troughs. 
Below I have taken the evidence provided by OECD (1987);  the method of 
trend estimation used is the Phase-Average Trend developed by the NBER (see 
OECD 1987 : 33-37 for the description).  I focussed on industrial production 
rather than on GDP because the former series are monthly, and thus make it 
possible to determine the turning points of the cycles with more detail.  In any 
case,  the  business  cycles  chronology  derived  from  GOP  does  not  differ 
substantially from that obtained on the basis of industrial production. 
2.  The  dates  of the  cycles  in  the  four  major  member  countries,  the 
aggregate EC-4 as  well  as  the  USA  are reported  in Table 8.  As  stated in 
footnote 6 of the table 8,  the true peak of the present cycle is  still unknown 
since the  cycle is  incomplete.  In  Germany and  the  USA,  it seems that the -49-
1982 cycle had a sub-cycle.  For the UK, the existence of  a possible sub-cycle 
with a trough in 1984 is not unanimously recognized because major strikes 
took place in 1984. 
The first striking result is the difference between the average  length of 
the  prosperity  phases  of the  past  business  cycles  and  the  length  of the 
prosperity phase which began in the early eighties. This is even more marked 
if the comparison is limited to the long expansion (from the 1950s to 1973). 
Table 6 shows, in fact, that the present prosperity phase is two to three times 
longer than the average duration of the same phase in the past. -50-
TABLElO: 
BUSINESS CYCLES CHRONOLOGY (1·2-3) 
CYCLES 
Initial 
trough 
GERMANY 
I 
II  1959/4 
III  1963/2 
IV  1967/5 
v  1971/12 
VI  1975/7 
VIa  1975/7 
VIb  1978/3 
VII  1982/12 
VIlaS  1982/12 
FRANCE 
I 
II  1959/1 
III  1963/3 
Ilia  1963/3 
Illb  1965/1 
IV  1967/10 
v  1971/5 
VI  1975/5 
VIa  1975/5 
VIb  1977/12 
VII  1982/8 
Peak 
1956/7 
1961/3 
1965/1 
1970/5 
-- --
1973/8 
1979/12 
1977/3 
1979/12 
[1990/12]6 
1986/4 
1958/1 
1960/9 
1964/1 
1964/1 
1966/7 
1969/5 
1974/7 
1979/7 
1977/1 
1979/7 
1990/77 
Total industrial production 
Final 
trough 
1959/4 
1963/2 
1967/5 
1971/12 
1975/7 
1982/12 
1978/3 
1982/12 
1987/2 
1959/1 
1963/3 
1967/10 
1965/1 
1967/10 
1971/5 
1975/5 
1982/8 
1977/12 
1982/8 
Trough to peak 
Dur. 
mths 
23 
23 
36 
20 
53 
20 
21 
[96] 
40 
20 
10 
10 
18 
19 
38 
50 
20 
19 
95 
Ampli-
tude4 
+11.2 
+11.7 
+14.1 
+10.7 
+16.6 
+10.9 
+10.4 
+11.2 
+ 6.4 
+10.8 
+10.8 
+ 4.0 
+ 65 
+12.2 
+18.6 
+13.4 
+11.2 
+8.0 
Peak to trough 
Dur. 
mths 
33 
23 
28 
19 
23 
36 
12 
12 
10 
12 
30 
45 
12 
15 
24 
10 
37 
11 
37 
Ampli-
tude4 
-7.1 
-85 
-17.0 
-8.6 
-15.7 
-14.9 
- 4.7 
-14.9 
-5.4 
-9.9 
-7.6 
-7.4 
-6.5 
-4.9 
- 8.9 
-17.9 
-12.6 
- 6.0 
-12.6 CYCLES 
Iriitial 
trough 
ITALY 
I 
II  1958/5 
II  a  1958/5 
lib  1960/12 
lie  1962/9 
III  1965/3 
Ilia  1965/3 
Illb  1968/3 
IV  1972/4 
v  1975/5 
Va  1975/5 
Vb  1977/12 
VI  1983/6 
UNITED KINGDOM 
I 
II  1958/10 
III  1963/1 
IV  1967/8 
v  1972/2 
VI  1975/8 
VII  1981/5 
Peak 
1955/6 
1963/9 
1960/6 
1962/1 
1963/9 
1969/1 
1967/2 
1969/1 
1974/1 
1980/4 
1976/12 
1980/4 
1989/127 
1957/6 
1960/3 
1965/5 
1969/6 
1973/6 
1979/6 
1988/97 
Final 
trough 
1958/5 
1965/3 
1960/12 
1962/9 
1965/3 
1972/4 
1968/3 
1972/4 
1975/5 
1983/6 
1977/12 
1983/6 
1958/10 
1963/1 
1967/8 
1972/2 
1975/8 
1981/5 
-51-
Trough to peak 
Dur. 
mths 
64 
25 
13 
12 
46 
23 
10 
21 
59 
19 
28 
78 
17 
28 
22 
16 
46 
88 
Ampli-
tude4 
+16.6 
+12.3 
+ 7.3 
+ 4.9 
+12.6 
+10.2 
+ 5.1 
+16.1 
+23.1 
+19.0 
+18.7 
+12.5 
+ 8.9 
+10.7 
+ 7.6 
+15.7 
+19.3 
+ 7.2 
Peak to trough 
Dur. 
mths 
35 
18 
6 
8 
18 
39 
13 
39 
16 
38 
12 
38 
16 
34 
27 
32 
26 
23 
Ampli-
tude4 
- 8.9 
-14.5 
-3.3 
- 4.8 
-14.5 
-11.8 
-2.7 
-11.8 
-20.4 
-23.2 
-14.6 
-23.2 
- 6.5 
-12.1 
-6.9 
-13.4 
-14.8 
-18.0 CYCLES 
Initial 
trough 
EUR4 
I 
II  1963/2 
II a  1963/2 
lib  1965/7 
III  1967/4 
IV  1972/1 
v  1975/6 
Va  1975/6 
Vb  1978/2 
VI  1982/11 
U.S.A. 
I  1958/4 
Ia  1958/4 
Ib  1961/2 
II  1962/12 
II a  1962/12 
lib  1964/10 
III  1967/7 
IV  1970/11 
v  1975/3 
Va  1975/3 
Vb  1980/7 
VI  1982/11 
VIaS  1982/11 
Vlb  1986/9 
Peak 
1961/3 
1964/2 
1964/2 
1966/3 
1970/3 
1973/9 
1980/1 
1977/1 
1980/1 
[1990/12? 
1960/1 
1960/1 
1961/12 
1966/10 
1963/5 
1966/10 
1969/8 
1973/9 
1979/3 
1979/3 
1981/7 
t989/47 
1984/8 
1989/47 
-52-
Trough to peak 
F"mal 
trough 
1963/2 
1967/4 
1965/7 
1967/4 
1972/1 
1975/6 
1982/11 
1978/2 
1982/11 
[97] 
1962/12 
1961/2 
1962/12 
1967/7 
1964/10 
1967/7 
1970/11 
1975/3 
1982/11 
1980/7 
1982/11 
1986/9 
Dur. 
mths 
12 
12 
8 
35 
20 
55 
19 
23 
21 
21 
10 
46 
5 
24 
25 
34 
48 
48 
12 
77 
21 
31 
Ampli-
tude4 
+ 5.4 
+ 5.4 
+ 3.1 
+ 6.5 
+ 8.9 
+15.3 
+10.4 
+ 7.6 
+18.9 
+18.9 
+ 6.3 
+ 6.0 
+ 2.2 
+ 7.3 
+ 7.4 
+14.2 
+21.3 
+21.3 
+ 6.9 
+14.8 
+5.2 
Peak to trough 
Dur. 
mths 
23 
38 
17 
13 
22 
21 
34 
13 
22 
35 
13 
12 
9 
17 
9 
15 
18 
44 
16 
16 
25 
Ampli-
tude4 
-5.0 
-6.4 
- 4.0 
-5.5 
-6.0 
-14.0 
-12.3 
-2.7 
-12.3 
-11.3 
-14.4 
-3.2 
-5.3 
-3.5 
-5.3 
-12.5 
-19.7 
-21.0 
-21.4 
-15.5 
-5.1 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
-53-
~  : OECD (1987), OECD leading indicators and business cycles in member countries 1960-1985, 
supplement nr39, January, to Main Economic Indicators. 
Information on cycles before 1960 were communicated directly by OECD services. 
Figures in italics refer to sub-cycles. 
Amplitude of the prosperity phase ( +) or recession phase (-) is measured as a percentage of the 
trend : percentage above trend at peak~  percentage below trend at trough (OECD 1987, p.74). 
This chronology is provisional. 
1990/12 is not the true peak of the cycle, but it is taken just to give  a rough approximation of the 
duration of the present prosperity. 
Provisional. Communicated directly by OECD services -54-
The explanation  for  this  anomaly  is  complex.  There  is,  first,  the 
normal  play  of the  business  cycle  mechanism,  in  which  the  recovery  in 
profitability stimulates investment which, in tum, fosters aggregate demand. 
Second,  this  dynamic  has  certainly  been  reinforced  by the  "1992 effect", 
which has helped to create a self-sustaining expansionary climate.  Third, it 
is very likely that the present prosperity is also (and mainly) due to the direct 
and indirect effects of the technological revolution on investment and on the 
level of activity. 
Table 4 has already indicated the direct effect : over the last decade, the 
growth of the sectors directly involved with the technological revolution has 
been much higher than the growth of industry as a whole.  Table 4 also shows 
that, in 1989, the importance of these branches is far from negligible, and that 
it increased  substantially  over time.  In  fact,  in  1989  the  office  and  data 
processing machines and the electrical goods sectors ranged from  10.7% in 
Italy to 17.3% in Germany of value added in manufacturing, as against 8.3% 
and 14.3% respectively in 1980.  Since that this direct dimension effect on the 
overall performances of industry .is amplified by the induced effects, it seems 
reasonable to infer that the technological revolution plays an essential role in 
explaining the cyclical prosperity. 
The cause of the present widespread dynamism is usually linked to the 
1992  objective;  there  could  also  be  another  interpretation,  namely  that 
something new was under way, and that the completion of the internal market 
was one of  the institutional changes required to speed the process of  emerging 
from  the long stagnation. 
3.  Let us now consider the question of the varying pattern of the business 
cycle, depending on the phases of the long wave. As recalled in part I of this 
paper,  theoretical reasons and historical experience indicate that,  during the 
long upswing, the prosperity phase of the business cycle is longer and/or more 
accentuated  than  the  recession,  whereas  the  converse  is  true  for  the  long -55-
stagnation. 
What  emerges  from  the  evidence  presented  in  tables  8  and  9? 
Unfortunately, the picture is not clear-cut: some findings bear out the theory 
and others do not.  Let us  start with  the latter.  All things considered,  the 
information in Table 6 tends to disprove the predictions of the theory.  This 
conclusion is unambiguous if we consider the long stagnation: in all countries 
the business cycle starting in 1975  had a prosperity phase which was much 
longer than the recession.  This is the exact opposite of what the theory says. 
Let us now consider the business cycles of the long expansion, from the 
fifties to the 1971-2/1975 cycle, situated at the turning point of the long wave. 
Italy  and  the USA  confirm  the  theory:  in  every cycle  the  duration of the 
prosperity  phase  is  clearly  longer  than  that  of the  recession<39>.  On  the 
other hand, for Germany,  France, the United Kingdom,  and EC-4, in most 
cases the recession was  longer than the prosperity phase.  However, if the 
average length of the  two  phases  is  calculated  over the  period in question 
(tableS), the picture changes somewhat. 
In Germany, despite the fact that during three cycles the prosperity phase was 
shorter than the recession, the average duration of the first is longer than that 
of the second (table 7), because of the long (and pronounced) upswing of the 
1967/1971  cycle.  Moreover,  if the  sub-cycles are taken  into consideration, 
France and the EC-4 (in which, according to the main cycles, depression was 
longer than  prosperity)  now  have  an  average length  of depression  slightly 
shorter than prosperity. -56-
TABLE 9:  Average length (months) of the phases of the b1•siness cycles 
during the long expansion 
Total industrial production (l) 
Prosperity  I  Recession 
Germany  25.5  23.3 
France  21.8  27.3 
(21.0)  (18.2) 
Italy  43.7  24.3 
UK  20.8  29.8 
EC-4  22.3  27.0 
(18.8)  (18.3) 
USA  31.5  19.3 
(19.8)  (14.0) 
(1)  Figures in brackets are determined by taking the sub-cycles into 
consideration.  The others refer only to major cycles -57-
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
1.  The answer to the question asked in the title of this paper is : probably, 
yes. 
This assessment is derived from the long waves theory, which is used 
as a general background.  The review of the salient aspects of this approach 
(Part  I)  shows  that  this  theory  provides  an  interesting  and  satisfactory 
explanation of the  long term dynamic of capitalist economies.  Moreover, 
recent evidence which uses new filtering techniques seems to settle the endless 
controversy on the existence of long waves in production : it now seems very 
reasonable to assume that long waves actually exist. 
One of the main explanations for long waves is the Schumpeterian idea 
of the  technological  revolution.  Historical  experience  shows  that  radical 
innovations appear in clusters and strong statistical support was also found for 
this  point.  The driving  force  is  investment:  radically  different plant  and 
equipment makes existing plant obsolete,  thus creating the need for massive 
replacement.  The investment boom that follows  starts a cumulative process 
of expansion. 
However, as was demonstrated by the French-Anglo-American schools 
of "regulation" and  "techno-economic paradigms", the long upswing cannot 
start unless the technological revolution is accompanied by appropriate changes 
in the institutional set. 
To complete the picture, one should add the crucial role of the rate of 
profit,  the evolution of which is  one of the  causes of the lower and  upper 
turning points in the long wave. 
2.  The present situation  shows  some  striking  similarities  with  the  long 
wave mechanism,  thus justifying the opinion that we have now entered the 
second phase of the long stagnation which began in 1974 (the recovery) and 
that, probably, the new long wave (the fifth)  could start in the nineties. -58-
In fact : 
a)  the computer and information technology innovations which have been 
progressively introduced since the seventies present all the characteristics of 
a technological revolution in the Schumpeterian sense; 
b)  these innovations  were accompanied,  especially in the eighties,  by a 
cluster of other radical innovations; 
c)  in the four major European countries as well as in the USA there was 
a sharp increase in profitability in the eighties; this brought the rate of profit 
in manufacturing to the early seventies level.  To begin with,  this positive 
change in profitability was associated with the movement of  the business cycle; 
afterwards, in Germany and the UK it was influenced by the favourable results 
of the branches situated at the core of the technological revolution; 
d)  since  1982  the  business  cycle  follows  an  atypical  pattern,  with  the 
prosperity phase being the  longest ever recorded  since  the  fifties.  If this 
anomalous result is linked with the findings of the previous analysis (points a, 
b, c above),  it points even more convincingly to the conclusion that we are 
now in the recovery phase of the long stagnation.  The conclusion is borne out 
by  a  further  point,  namely  the  direct  influence  on  the  overall  industrial 
performance of the accelerated growth of the branches which are at the core 
of the technological revolution. 
3.  The processes underlying the present situation can be summarized as 
follows  : 
the depression of the second half of the seventies radically changed the 
relative  strengths  of social  groups.  Mass  unemployment  undermined  the 
Unions' ability to obtain better wages and improved working conditions, real 
wages stagnated and  the profit share increased.  Initially, this was the main 
determinant of the recovery in profitability; 
the raising rate of profit had a twofold effects  : it stimulated cyclical 
prosperity  (forming  the  1975/82  cycle)(40)  and  helped  the  spread  of the -59-
technological revolution; 
as  new technologies penetrated the economy,  they pushed up labour 
productivity and this further reinforced the upward movement of the rate of 
profit.  The persistent stagnation (or small increase) of  real wages in fact ment 
that profits were the main beneficiary of productivity increases; 
the generalized recovery in profitability since 1982 now replicates, on 
a larger scale, the "virtuous circle" of the 1975/82 cycle. 
4.  Two "exogenous" factors can magnify the present favourable long-term 
prospects.  The first is the development of the East European countries: if the 
outcome of the present situation is favourable, a huge market will be available 
for EEC industry.  This will provide an exceptional stimulus for the growth 
process already in operation. 
The second factor is the completion of the internal market.  While the 
present success of  the 1992 objective probably stems from the fact that the new 
long wave was already  "in the pipeline",  the  institutional  changes  that are 
being implemented will substantially reinforce the underlying movement. 
5.  However, it should be noted that the picture is not entirely rosy:  the 
favourable prospects described are subject to several uncertainties and, in any 
case, a new. long upswing will not automatically solve all the economic and 
social problems inherited from the long stagnation. 
The most fundamental  obstacle to growth is  represented by domestic 
and international inequalities, a factor that delays the beginning of the fifth 
long wave and that could even stop it.  The mass unemployment of the 1970s 
together with  economic policies  sharply  increased  domestic  inequalities  in 
many European countries and in the USA, and they now remain severe.  To 
begin  with,  this  development  was  considered  favourable  by  many  people 
because it shifted the balance of powers in favour of enterprises, but there is 
now a growing awareness that such unbalanced income distribution will  not -60-
provide adequate demand for growing output (fylecote, 1990). 
The  international  aspect  of inequality  relates  to  the  widening  gap 
between  the  North  and  the  South  of the  world.  In the  short  run  such 
inequality does not seem to threaten world stability, but this will certainly not 
be the case in the long run.  Western countries could thus go on developing 
only if  the problem of world poverty is solved.  As recently pointed out in the 
Brundtland  report,  this  is  also  the  condition  on  which  a  major ecological 
disaster can be avoided. 
Finally, a new long upswing will not necessarily solve the problem of 
unemployment.  The secular trend of technical change in capitalist economies 
is towards mechanization, which means less labour per unit of output.  The 
present technological revolution is perfectly in line with this broad tendency, 
which is even becoming more extreme.  Of course, the expansion of demand 
can  offset  the  adverse  effect  on  employment  of productivity  increases. 
However, the present situation is characterized by an increasing use of capital 
goods to produce not only consumer goods but also capital goods.  In addition, 
new technologies are rapidly spreading in the service sector, which  up to now 
has been highly labour-intensive.  Coeteris paribus it is thus unlikely that, in 
the medium/long term, the manpower shaken out by technical change will be 
fully absorbed by the general expansion. 
All this emphasizes the necessity to devise ways of reducing the total 
labour  supply.  The  main  area  which  deserves  attention  is  certainly  the 
reduction of working hours.  To be effective, this measure should be sudden, 
massive  and  generalized.  It goes  without saying that this  raises a host of 
problems, chiefly the distributive effect of such a measure. Should the cost be 
borne entirely by workers, the cost or could wage cuts be less than proportio-
nate to the reduction in working time ? 
Although  recent  experience  has  shown  that  a  two-digit  rate  of 
unemployment does not have the effect of disrupting social structures (as was 
feared in the sixties), I believe that, on moral grounds, our democracies cannot -61-
afford to neglect the challenge of  new, persistent, massive unemployment and 
offer upcoming generations the prospect of a "two-tier society". -62-
(1)  Long waves were studied first as a price phenomenon and subsequently 
from the point of  view of "real" variables. This paper deals solely with 
the latter aspect. 
(2)  Nevertheless, the fact that this long wave does not appear clearly from 
data  could  simply  be  due  to  inadequate  statistics.  In  fact,  figures 
referring  to  that period  are  not very reliable  and,  in addition,  they 
concern one country (U  .K) almost exclusively. 
(3)  For a  more exhaustive  summary of the empirical evidence see Van 
Duijn (1983,  Chapter IX),  Kleinknecht (1986),  Screpanti (1984) and 
Goldstein (1988  : 81-92). 
(4)  This is for instance.the case when, as in Van Ewijk's work (1982), the 
trend  elimination  is  obtained  by  using  growth  rates.  As  noted  by 
Reijnders (1990: 237), this procedure not only tends to create "fastard 
cycles"  but  also  suppresses  long  term  movements  and  accordingly 
accentuates short-term fluctuations. 
(5)  "Technological paradigm" is taken here by analogy with the scientific 
paradigm in the Kuhn sense,  "as a model and a pattern of solution of 
selected technological problems, based on selected  principles derived 
from natural sciences and on selected material technologies" (Dosi, G, 
Technological  paradigms  and  technological  trajectories.  The 
determinants and directions of technical change and the transformation 
of the economy, in: FREEMAN, C. editor 1984: 83).  In other words, 
the technological paradigm  refers to  "the prevailing engineering and 
managerial  common  sense  for best productivity and  most profitable 
practice,  which  is  applicable  in almost any  industry"  (Freeman and 
Perez, 1988 : 48) 
(6)  The following considerations are inspired by Freeman and Perez (1988 
: 47-58). 
(7)  A distinction should be made between  "invention"  and its successful 
introduction  on  the  market  as  "innovation",  because  the  time  lag 
between the two is sometimes considerable. 
(8)  Fiat provides a good example of this: in the seventies its economic and 
financial situation was poor and it managed to overcome this by means 
of important product and process innovations. 
(9)  In  Mandel's jargon this  is  an  indication  of the  capital  intensity  of 
production.  It is measured either as the capital/output ratio or as the 
ratio of fixed and circulating capital to the stock of capital advanced for 
wages. -63-
The capital intensity of production should  not be  confused with  the 
degree of mechanization, represented by the capitalnabour ratio. 
(10)  This indicator can be proxied by the profit/wages ratio. 
(11)  Screpanti (1984) presented an interesting model showing the influence 
of  social struggles on the upper turning point of  the long wave.  Dockes 
and Rosier (1983) go further, putting social conflicts at the core of the 
dynamic of long waves. 
(12)  Basic innovation is defined as something that starts a new industry. 
(13)  The time constants of the innovation waves diminish by the geometric 
ratio of 1  ,414; this allowed Marchetti to extrapolate to the fourth long 
wave. 
(14)  In fact, the application of  a non-parametric test to the frequencies of  the 
whole period shows that the alternation of  periods of  high propensity to 
innovate with periods of low propensity is not random. 
(15)  For another criticism of Mensch's theory see Mansfield (1983). 
(16)  Kleinknecht's  sample  was  obtained  by  adding  together  the  sets  of 
innovations by Mensch, Van Duijn and Haustein and Neuwirth (1982), 
which  produced a total  of 461  cases of basic innovations.  55  cases 
were common to the three authors and 80 were reported by two authors 
only. This introduced an implicit weight to ensure the radical nature of 
innovations.  In fact,  the  cases  reported  by  the  three  authors  were 
counted three times;  cases included in  two of the three sources were 
counted twice 
(17)  Kleinknecht's periodization of the economic wave is slightly different 
from Van Duijn's chronology reported in Table 1. 
(18)  More  generally,  Olson  (1982)  linked  the  decline  of  nations  to 
institutional rigidities. 
(19)  A general definition of "regulation" is provided by the philosopher G. 
Canguilhem: "Ia regulation, c'est l'ajustement, conformement a  quelque 
regie ou  norme, d'  une pluralite de mouvements ou d'  actes et de leurs 
effets ou produits que leur diversite ou  leur succession rend d' abord 
etrangers les uns aux autres". 
(20)  According to Boyer (1986  : 54-55) this concept designates any set of 
rules  and  individual  and  collective  behaviours  which  have  the  three 
following properties: 
- they  make possible conflicting decentralized decisions  compatible -64-
without  the  necessity  for  individuals  or  even  institutions  to 
comprehend the logic of the whole system; 
- they control and regulate the prevailing accumulation mode; 
- they reproduce basic social relationships by means of a system of 
historically determined institutional forms. 
(21)  This point is discussed in Reati (1990 : 20-23). 
(22)  These factors are analysed in Reati (1990), with reference to the last 
long wave in the main EEC countries. 
(23)  Here there is an unavoidable ambiguity in the terminology adopted for 
the phases of the long wave.  In this paragraph the business cycle is 
meant to be composed of two phases: 
(a) prosperity, when production accelerates, and 
(b) recession, when it slows down. 
(24)  It is well known that, during the "Golden Sixties", because economists 
forgot the long waves,  they were led to think that the business cycle 
was "obsolete" in the sense that deep depressions would never happen 
again.  If  economies did not sink in the 1970s as they did in the 1930s, 
it is because of  massive intervention by the State to support demand and 
to help enterprises directly 
(25)  Dupriez (id.  : 255) also quotes A.  Aftalion's book of 1914 and W.C. 
Mitchell's book (1928) in which there is the same observation. 
(26)  See also P. Dupriez and Ost (  1986, : 99-101). 
(27)  For an opitmistic view on Europe's growth possibilities in the 1990s see 
Giersch (1990).  However, this  author's analysis is  n_ot  based on the 
long wave mechanism. 
(28)  For a positive answer see Griibler and Nowotny (1990) 
(29)  A  good  example  of renewal  of old  industries  is  provided  by  the 
automobile  and  textile  industries.  With  the  new  equipment,  the 
European textile industry could successfully face the competition from 
the Third World 
(30)  On all these points see OECD 1989 : 14-15. 
(31)  This is what Freeman and  Perez (1988  : 60) calls  "systemation"  and 
"networking"  resulting  from  the  information  intensive  productive 
organization. -65-
(32)  This appreciation of the radical  nature of the innovations should be 
taken as provisional and tentative because, as already noted, it is risky 
to make a firm judgment when the process is ongoing. 
(33)  At the beginning of the  1980s,  10%  of US copper was extracted via 
microbial methods (Sharpe 1985 : 170) 
(34)  This term refers to all the electronic systems used in aircraft, engines, 
missiles and spacecraft 
(35)  Experience has shown that, especially in French industry, this element 
was far from negligible.  See Reati 1990, Chapter VII 
(36)  For a discussion of the statistical definition of profits and related issues 
see Reati (1990, chapter V). 
(37)  Note  that,  in  formula  1,  value  added  is  net  while,  in  the  current 
measures  of capacity  utilization,  output  is  gross.  However,  if the 
percentage of depreciation is the same for actual and potential output, 
cu does not change when defined on a net or a gross basis. 
(38)  In fact, of  the three categories of commodities forming the capital stock 
(machinery,  vehicles,  constructions)  the  first  two  are  produced  by 
manufacturing.  However,  the  different  evolution  of PV  A  and  PK 
depends not only on the prices of construction but also on the different 
commodity basket making up the two indices 
(39)  The only exception is the first cycle ( 1958-1962) in the USA, in which 
the  length  of the  prosperity  phase  was  shorter  than  the  recession. 
However, the amplitude of the prosperity ( 18.9%) exceeded that of the 
recession (  -11.3%). 
(  40)  It is known that profitability is a leading indicator in the business cycle 
since troughs and peaks of  the rate of  profit usually precede troughs and 
peaks in production (see, for instance, Reati  1983) -66-
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